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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of active labour market policies in Spain, focusing on the 
public employment service (PES), training, and employment incentives. Previously, the main features 
of unemployment subsidies and their connection to active policies is presented. The majority of the 
resources is targeted to employment incentives, despite their high deadweight effect given their 
characteristics. Data also show the scarce role of PES as intermediary. Finally, we present a discussion 
on the main guidelines to reform active labour market policies in order to improve their efficiency. 
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1 Introduction  
Active labour market policies (ALMP) are tools addressed to either increase the probability of re-
employment of unemployed workers or to reduce the probability of losing the job in the case of 
employed workers. In Spain, its provision is characterised by the decentralisation of ALMP, which 
entails that Autonomous Communities are (now) responsible for the orientation and training of 
workers. 
In 1991, the process of decentralisation of ALMP begins with the transfer of competencies on 
occupational training from the central government to Catalonia. Similarly, Catalonia was the first 
autonomous community to obtain competency regarding employment and training, back in 1997. 
The process of decentralisation of all ALMP consummated in 2011, after they were transferred to 
the Basque Country.  
Under this regulatory framework, the regional Public Employment Services (PES) assume the 
functions of control and regulation of the labour market, reflected in the following activities: 
monitoring of the labour market (management of subsidies to promote employment and vocational 
training, management and control of Escuelas-Taller, and management of active employment policies 
around personalised itineraries for jobseekers), authorisation and control of employment agencies, 
and management of the EURES Network1.  
In this paper, we aim to provide an overview of ALMP in Spain. Nevertheless, we firstly present the 
main features of unemployment subsidies and their connection to active policies. After that, major 
expenditure figures on these policies are presented, followed by a revision of the characteristics of 
job placement, training and employment incentives. The paper finishes with a discussion section 
regarding the proposed lines on which to base a potential policy reform. 
2 Decentralisation and the institutional organisation of labour market policies 
Regarding competent authorities for passive policies, it is worth mentioning that the State is 
exclusively responsible for this area. The Sistema Nacional de Empleo (SNE, in English, National 
Employment System) consists of the State PES (SEPE) and the PES of the Autonomous Communities. 
The objectives and functions of the Law are articulated in turn in the role played by the National 
Employment System, defined as the set of structures, measures, and actions necessary to promote 
and develop employment policy.  
Law 56/2003 on Employment is the main regulatory framework of ALMPs, as it organises their 
decentralisation framework and defends the need to establish and define the collaboration and 
cooperation mechanisms with the PES of the autonomous communities. To complete the regulatory 
mechanics between the different levels of authorities, subsequent normative developments have 
delved into this law in greater detail, which is the basis for the current employment policy.  
2.1 The process of transferring to the autonomous communities 
The basis for the “decentralisation” and shift of ALMP can be found in the Constitution and the 
Autonomy Statutes of the autonomous communities and in the Employment Law of 2003, where 
employment policy is included in the framework of economic policy. Specifically, the management 
                                                     
 
1 For an in-depth analysis, see Serrano (2004). 
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of professional education, support for employment, and a broad sense of labour intermediation are 
defined in article 149.1.7. ª of the Spanish Constitution2.  
The start of the shift of authority over ALMP can be dated back to the transfer of responsibility over 
professional occupational training to Catalonia in 1991. Likewise, in 1997, Catalonia was the first 
autonomous community to obtain competence in work, employment, and training issues. Currently, 
the process of decentralisation and change in management of the entire ALMP system has culminated 
in the handover of power in 2010 to the Basque Country.. 
The creation of the PES as bodies responsible for the management and/or execution of the ALMP 
at the autonomous level has been conducted on an uncoordinated time scale, following different 
schedules according to the policies of each autonomous community. In Galicia, for example, a 
Galician Placement Service was created based on Royal Decree (RD) 735/1995, which currently 
functions as the body managing the ALMP. In other autonomous communities, a managing body 
was created as soon as the shift had been completed in terms of work, employment, and training.  
In summary, the process of transferring powers began in 1991 and was completed in 2010. Certain 
autonomous communities enjoyed all transferred prerogatives in 1997, while others only recently 
acquired them. As the process has followed different schedules, the experience and the knowhow of 
each autonomous community are different, and therefore the implementation of ideas in the SNE is 
becoming a fundamental aspect.  
 
With this regulatory framework, the regional PES assume the functions of control regulation of the 
labour market, which is reflected in labour market control activities: 
- Management of state subsidies for promoting employment and professional training.  
- Management and control of workshop schools and craft centres (in Spanish, Escuelas Taller y 
Casas de Oficios). 
- Management of the ALMP in terms of roadmaps of personalised service for job seekers, 
according to their characteristics and their personal and professional requirements, as well as 
preventive and personalised PES services.  
- Authorisation and control of Placement Agencies.  
- Management of the EURES network.  
At the normative level, the collaboration between Autonomous PES and for-profit placement 
agencies has been possible since 2010. However, the Law needed additional regulations and the 
signing of collaboration agreements between agencies and Autonomous PES and, at this point, the 
process failed. 
The national Government has designed a new framework agreement for both regional and national 
PES to collaborate with intermediation agencies under a common architecture. In August 2013, the 
beginning of the process started and 14 autonomous communities agree to participate (Aragón, 
Asturias, Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia, La 
Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Comunidad Valenciana and Navarra). In October 2013, a press note from the 
Employment and Social Security Ministry informed about the presentation of 204 placements 
                                                     
 
2Article 149.1.7.ª of the Spanish Constitution. The State does not have exclusive competence on the 
following issues: 7. Labour legislation, without notwithstanding its execution by bodies of the Autonomous 
Communities.  
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agencies, 134 were admitted and 70 rejected. However, the process is now suspended until the appeals 
of rejected firms were resolved3.  
The administrative conditions include the maximum price that placement agencies can charge for 
each labour insertion. This price goes from 300 Euro (individuals between 16 and 44 years old, 
unemployed for 3 to 6 months) to 3,000 Euro (long-term unemployed individuals over 55). It is 
obvious that age and time in unemployment are key variables in labour insertion. However, given the 
characteristics of Spanish unemployed workers, there is an important variable missing in the design 
of this administrative agreement: the level of education.  
2.2 Collaboration and cooperation 
Although coordination between different Administrations is an aspect of the territorial organisation 
model included in the Spanish Constitution, it is necessary to ensure that, in effect, this coordination 
does in fact take place.  
Regarding the coordination of unemployment benefits and employment management, after 
decentralisation, collaboration agreements have been drawn up between each Autonomous PES and 
the SEPE. In practice, to the extent that citizens go to the same employment office4 to manage their 
registration as a job seeker to collect their unemployment benefit, this process has not affected them, 
and, in truth, they are not aware of the redistribution of responsibilities between administrations. The 
novelty is that in a single employment office, there is staff of the Central Administration (managing 
the benefits) and staff hired by the Autonomous Administration (managing the ALMP). 
Additionally, the Employment Law of 2003 recognises work on collaboration, coordination, and 
cooperation as a fundamental aspect of the adequate development of employment policy. Therefore, 
two bodies are recognised within the SNE: the Sectorial Conference of Labour Affairs and the 
General Council of the National Employment System.  
 The Sectorial Conference of Labour Affairs is the general collaboration, coordination, and 
cooperation instrument between the State Administration and the administrations of the 
autonomous communities and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla in terms of employment policy, 
especially in the development of Execution Plans of the European Employment Strategy.  
 The General Council of the SNE, part of the MEYSS, is the consultative body for 
institutional participation of the public Administrations and of social stakeholders in 
employment policy. It comprises representatives of the State Central Administration, of the 
autonomous communities, of the Cities of Ceuta and Melilla, of the most representative 
employers organisations (CEOE and CEPYME), and of labour unions (UGT, CCOO, CIG, 
ELA). 
We should stress the role of the Sectorial Conference of Labour Affairs, which has become a highly 
relevant body for defining policies, as it is the place where the SEPE and Autonomous PES meet 
and discuss policy.  
                                                     
 
3 http://prensa.empleo.gob.es/WebPrensa/noticias/laboral/detalle/2065.  
4 Regional and national employment offices are co-located. In the same employment offices, there is space 
for passive policies and for active policies.  
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2.3 Information System for Public Employment Services 
The Information System for Public Employment Services (in Spanish, SISPE, Sistema de Información 
de los Servicios Públicos de Empleo) is the common information system and the technical instrument 
bringing together labour intermediation, ALMP, and SUB management. 
This tool was implemented in 2005 as a consequence of transferring the ALMP, which resulted in a 
single State Administration and Autonomous Administrations information portal. Its objective was 
guaranteeing basic, uniform, and coordinated management in all ACs. Therefore, it became the basis 
for more links between passive policies (Central Administration) and active policies (autonomous 
communities). The same tool includes written information on workers registered with the PES as of 
each last working day of the month, the changes in demand and their causes (entries and exits), 
employment offers or jobs offered by companies registered with the PES, information on contracts 
deriving from the mandatory nature of contract registration when going through PES, and, finally, 
the placements or jobs covered by a worker. The additional advantage of a placements file over a 
contracts one is that the placements can be statistically counted in the month in which the placement 
begins, which provides information about the relationship of the person with the PES (registered or 
not) and about the offer or job he or she is filling.  
Summing up, SISPE contains all the information that jobseekers provide PES when they register in 
the employment offices. Regarding the contracts file, the data refers to the workers’ characteristics 
and also the firms’ characteristics. Therefore, the potential of both files to analyse the labour market 
performance of jobseekers is really high.   
The SISPE is a basic tool shedding light on the management of the ALMP with common indicators 
for all autonomous community, thus leading to information sharing. Nevertheless, each PES is 
allowed sufficient autonomy to promote the development of new IT applications that would facilitate 
its management. Some autonomous communities opted for their own information system (Andalucía, 
Canaries, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Galicia and the Valencian Community). In any case, integration 
into the overall management system must be guaranteed (and, in fact, it is).  
One of the future challenges still to be implemented is to allow an unemployed person in any 
autonomous community to consult vacancies in any PES without having to check the 17 websites 
belonging to each autonomous community. In this context, the Single Employment Portal (in Spanish, 
Portal Único de Empleo) announced at the Sectorial Employment and Labour Affairs Conference in 
April 2013 is a basic coordination instrument to avoid labour market fragmentation.  
 
3 Unemployment and benefits 
The Spanish system of unemployment benefits (SUB) consists of an unemployment insurance and 
an unemployment assistance. Its regulation has been recently modified to reduce, in some cases, its 
total amount and increase the age at which one becomes eligible for the benefit.  
Workers who have lost their job, and who have paid unemployment insurance for at least 360 days 
during the last six years prior to unemployment, are eligible to receive the unemployment benefit5. 
                                                     
 
5 Potential workers included in the Special Agrarian System for Social Security have their own contributory 
benefit. 
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For a full-time job, contribution days are counted 7 days per week (5 working days per week weighted 
by the coefficient 1.4)6.  
The duration of this benefit ranges from a minimum of 120 days (for individuals who had worked a 
year) up to a maximum of 720 (for individuals who have worked 6 or more years).  
The amount paid out in benefits depends on the regulatory base for each worker, calculated as the 
mean of the contribution bases7 for unemployment in the last 180 days worked (excluding 
remuneration for overtime). Thus, the monthly amount is 70% of the regulatory base, falling to 50% 
from the seventh month onwards. This second rate was approved in July 2012, with a prior amount 
of 60%. Nevertheless, there are minimum and maximum amounts determined by the number of 
children and considering the Indicador Público de Renta de Efectos Múltiples (IPREM, in English Public 
Income Indicator with Multiple Effects8). 
The unemployment assistance is an additional benefit that complements the contributory insurance 
and can be received if the person in question has an income of less than 75% of the Salario Mínimo 
Interprofesional (SMI, in English Interprofessional Minimum Wage), under the following assumptions:  
 Workers who have completed the contributory benefit (unemployment insurance) and have 
family responsibilities. 
 Workers who have completed the contributory benefit and have no family responsibilities 
but are over 45. 
 Workers who have not met the minimum contribution period to gain access to the 
unemployment insurance. 
Its length depends on the workers’ age and the presence of family responsibilities and ranges from 6 
to 24 months.  
Furthermore, in the case of workers over the age of 559 who have contributed to the unemployment 
fund for at least 6 years during their professional life, two particularities must be taken into account: 
first, the income requirement is applied to the family unit if the worker has a spouse and/or children 
below the age of 26, older children with disabilities, or foster children. And second, the subsidy length 
is extended up to the age when the worker can access a contributory retirement pension. 
Regarding activation, the beneficiaries of unemployment benefits or subsidies should register as job 
seekers, renewing this condition every 3 months, and comply with the “commitment to activity” (in 
Spanish, Compromiso de activación)10.  
                                                     
 
6 In the case of part-time jobs, each day worked is considered as a contribution day, regardless of the 
duration of the day. If the day is divided into 5 or more days of work per week, the contribution period will 
be equal to the duration of the contract. If the day is distributed within 5 working days a week, the total 
days of service shall be multiplied by the coefficient 1.4. 
7 The contribution base can be equated to the salary, but there are minimum and maximum thresholds (in 
2014, 753 and 3,597 Euros per month, respectively). 
8 The IPREM is an index used as reference for awarding, for example, help, scholarships, subventions, and 
unemployment subsidies. 
9 Until the Royal Decree-Law 20/2012 of 13 July came into force, on measures guaranteeing budgetary 
stability and promoting competitiveness, the age at which this right could be requested was 52. 
10 A wide analysis of the “commitment to activity” can be found in Mato (2011). 
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The commitment to activity is understood as active job seeking: applying to open job postings and 
providing the Public Employment Service (PES) with proof of attendance within 5 days; accepting 
an adequate match; and participating in specific activities related to motivation, information, training, 
retraining, or professional placement purposes, aiming to increase employability, as well as to meet 
the obligations described in the regulations on unemployment benefits. Failure to comply entails 
disciplinary effects such as minor sanctions after the first 100 days of receiving the benefit.  
In 2000, Renta Activa de Inserción (RAI, in English Active Insertion Income) was commenced for the 
first time, aimed at the unemployed with special economic needs and difficulties in finding 
employment, including measures to improve their job re-entry. The programme was renewed each 
year until it became permanent in 2006. RAI is aimed at people over 45 years of age, unemployed for 
at least 1 year, who have exhausted their benefits and/or the unemployment subsidy and who lack 
income of more than 75% of the SMI in their family unit.  
The beneficiaries of RAI must sign the commitment to activity and must participate in activities 
improving their employability, such as individualised meetings, job entry itineraries, professional 
interviews to define their professional profile, activities aimed at defining their personal job entry 
plan, employability plans, and/or training and/or volunteering activities. The amount paid out in 
2014 was raised to 426 Euros (80% of the IPREM), and this benefit has a maximum duration of 11 
months.  
 
3.1.1 Temporary unemployment protection programmes  
One of the measures taken by the Government from the start of the crisis has been an extension of 
the benefits that entail some type of unemployment subsidy to cases where the family unit does not 
receive any income. Thus, in August 2009, the Programa Temporal de Protección por Desempleo e Inserción 
(PRODI, in English Temporary Unemployment Protection and Insertion Programme) was launched, with the 
goal of providing a certain level of income for workers who exhausted their unemployment benefit 
or subsidy and still do not have a job. Thus, workers below the age of 65 who are ending their benefit 
period and are without rights to a subsidy or who have exhausted it and lack income over 75% of the 
SMI can participate, on a one-time basis, in this extraordinary benefit for six months at a level of 80% 
of the Public Income Indicator with Multiple Effects (IPREM). These workers should, furthermore, 
meet the commitment to activity included in the PES.  
Initially, the duration of the PRODI was six months. However, constant crisis conditions led to its 
extension in February and August 2011. To date, this programme has been modified to direct it 
towards workers of less than 30 years of age or above 45 or to persons between 30 and 45 years who 
have family responsibilities.  
With the end of the PRODI extensions in February 2011, new measures were approved to promote 
the transition to stable employment and professional retraining of the unemployed, among them a 
programme aimed towards persons who have exhausted their unemployment benefit and have no 
rights to the subsidy or who have also exhausted the latter. The novel feature in this measure, named 
PREPARA, in comparison with PRODI was that, although an economic support system was 
included, there was much greater emphasis on participation in any form of activation policies aimed 
at improving job reinsertion. That is, the PRODI introduced an extraordinary benefit where, to 
participate, beneficiaries must meet obligations stemming from the commitment to activity, which 
implies active job seeking, accepting an adequate job match, and participating in activities aimed at 
improving employability. Meanwhile, in the programme approved in February 2011, participants had 
the right to carry out a personalised insertion itinerary, to take part in active measures that aimed to 
improve their qualifications, and to receive support up to the amount of 75% of the IPREM if they 
did not have income of at least 75% of the SMI. There was an obligation to participate in the active 
labour market policies (ALMP), as economic support can only be requested once the personalised 
insertion itinerary has been commenced. Furthermore, it was stated that the PES “will designate the 
required number of coaches, employment promoters, and staff to provide individualised attention to 
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beneficiaries”, perhaps indirectly admitting the difficulty of following through with such measures. 
Given the resources of the PES, it is difficult to conduct follow-up and personalised training for the 
unemployed.  
This step is a relevant change in direction in the rollout of this type of measures. Previously, the 
commitment to activity signed by the unemployed when they access any type of benefit was an 
additional measure with little or no effect. With the PREPARA programme, the necessary condition 
of accessing help with the itinerary and receipt of support, on a monthly basis, is participation. Thus, 
the importance of participating in ALMP when unemployed is recognised, with the goal of finding a 
better way back to employment. 
This programme requires the implication of national and regional PES. On the one side, SEPE is 
responsible for the payment and, on the other side, regional PES are in charge of supervision of 
participation in active measures by participants. The collaboration agreements between SEPE and 
regional PES are the framework for this kind of programmes which required the participation of 
both organizations.   
The initial length of this programme was six months, with two extensions enacted. In August 2012, 
the government proposed a new extension, introducing several modifications justified by the 
assessment of the PREPARA plan and based on the “limited success of the job insertion plan among 
beneficiaries”. 
The results showed that out of the 500,859 PREPARA beneficiaries up to July 2012, 307,029 people 
(61.3%) had already finished the programme. Ninety-three per cent of the insertion plans were 
training activities, and less than 8% had participated in retraining courses. As for insertion, 70% had 
not returned to work, and only 18% had held down work for more than two months. This assessment 
was not positive, and changes were therefore proposed to improve participant employability. 
Although the evaluation effort should be viewed positively, we have to state that it could be 
improved, as there is no control group with which to compare the 30% insertion rate obtained. 
Additionally, the published information does not contain data on the time elapsed from the end of 
the programme up to the assessment or whether there were differences based on groups, insertion 
activity types, or a person’s educational level. Furthermore, given the country’s economic outlook in 
2013 (532 thousand jobs were lost in that year), the evaluation of these results should have been 
compared with unemployed groups that did not participate in the programme.   
The follow-up to the commitment to activity is reinforced through the inclusion of a requirement 
that the programme request accreditation of the active search activities for at least 30 days. 
Additionally, the obligation was included to participate in ALMP actions and job searching among 
the offers proposed by the Public Employment Services (an obligation that was already included at 
the onset of the programme), as such participation is mandatory to receive support. Furthermore, an 
obligation to accept an adequate job offer11 as offered by the PES was specified. 
However, it is worth noting that these requirements are not novel; instead, their explicit inclusion is 
a reminder of the commitment and focus on compliance. The most relevant change is the 
requirement of accrediting active search actions for at least 30 days before requesting a benefit. This 
                                                     
 
11An adequate job offer can be defined as a job offer that is desired by the worker or demanded by the 
worker’s particular profession, or another profession adjusted to the physical and educational abilities of 
the unemployed person, or a profession from the last place of employment if it lasted at least 3 months. 
Furthermore, after a year of uninterrupted receipt of benefits, this offer can be any profession, as per the 
decision of the PES. The job offer will be adequate if the workplace is located in the same place of residence 
as the worker or, at maximum, 30 Km away, and if the commute does not exceed 25% of the working day 
or 20% of the monthly salary, with the exception of jobs with accommodation provided. 
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requirement entails a focus on activation and, afterwards, the payment of the benefit tied to active 
search. The perception of benefit by the unemployed person changes, as the link between an active 
search and a payment is made explicit.  
3.2 Analysis of changes in the number of unemployment benefit recipients 
The following graph shows the changes in the number of beneficiaries of the various types of 
unemployment benefits. From 2007, the number of workers receiving the insurance or the 
unemployment assistance began to rise as a consequence of rising unemployment. While in 2005 and 
2006 the number of benefit recipients was 670,000, it increased by 7.8% in 2007, and in 2008 it 
reached the one million mark, an increase of over 40%. The same increase could be observed in 2009, 
resulting in 1.6 million people receiving the unemployment benefits.  
The evolution of the unemployment assistance is similar. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of 
recipients was stable at approximately 350,000. In 2008, it nearly reached 450,000, and in 2009 over 
750,000 people received this subsidy. In summary, the brutal destruction of employment starting in 
2007 resulted in a substantial increase of workers depending on the unemployment protection system.  
Beginning in 2010, we can observe falling numbers of benefit recipients. However, this decrease is 
not due to reduced unemployment but to increased long-term unemployment and, thus, the 
exhaustion of rights to benefits, as the maximum number of months that can be received is 24. In 
fact, the number of assistance recipients continued increasing and exceeded one million people in 
2011. 
Regarding the PRODI beneficiaries, the number of people receiving this extraordinary benefit rose 
dramatically, achieving its maximum level in April 201012. The functioning of the programme, where 
one can be a beneficiary only once, meant that as long-term unemployment rose, the number of 
potential beneficiaries dropped. In 2013, 113 unemployed received this benefit. 
Table 1. Beneficiaries of the Spanish system of unemployment benefits (2000-2013) 
 Unemployment 
insurance 
Unemployment 
assistance 
Temporary agricultural 
workers 
PRODI RAI Total 
2000 446.678 367.851 224.170  3.966 1.042.665 
2001 501.258 357.072 233.495  7.752 1.099.576 
2002 565.902 354.092 224.621  50.777 1.195.392 
2003 630.443 357.886 202.033  16.325 1.206.686 
2004 663.154 352.954 207.031  39.253 1.262.392 
2005 687.033 352.051 206.450  49.666 1.295.200 
2006 720.384 353.907 204.795  51.346 1.330.432 
2007 780.205 373.891 201.784  65.600 1.421.480 
2008 1.100.879 448.441 197.744  67.567 1.814.631 
2009 1.624.792 764.805 196.083  95.543 2.681.223 
2010 1.471.826 995.611 199.715 249.902 125.680 3.042.734 
2011 1.328.020 1.059.474 201.024 70.818 186.316 2.845.652 
2012 1.381.261 1.124.953 201.017 1.057 233.773 2.942.061 
2013 1.310.915 1.111.019 202.854 113 240.252 2.865.153 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
3.2.1 Entry flow analysis for the benefits 
In the following tables, we show the entry and exit causes for the PES, both in the contributive and 
the assistance modalities. These data allow us to determine the cause of access to the benefit and how 
this cause has changed with the crisis.  
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The large majority of registrations in the SUB have their origin at the contributive level. In this 
modality, there are two main causes: layoffs and end of contract, which correspond to an open-ended 
and temporary end of hiring, respectively. In 2007-08, the end of a contract was the main reason for 
claiming the benefit in over 60% of the cases. From 2009, the weight of layoffs was increased, as well 
as, above all, the weight of suspended work and partial unemployment.  
Regarding layoffs, we must note that their number was high even in times of economic expansion13. 
The data suggest that an individual layoff is used as an adjustment instrument for the company staff, 
both during crisis years and in expansion periods (García-Serrano, 2011). In 2003 and 2004, it seems 
that the use of layoffs increased, with their main cause being article 1 of the Law 45/2002, with a 
growth of 147.5% and 58.5% in comparison with the previous year, in each year of the period. In 
2005 this number decreased by 10.4%, then increased again in 2006 and 2009 (Cueto and Rodríguez, 
2013). 
The implementation of Law 45/2002 saw the creation of the “express layoff”, i.e., a rapid (maximum 
of 48 hours) and easy layoff process (termination letter, recognition of unfairness, and severance 
deposit) in exchange for a higher severance (45 days of salary per year worked) than in the case of 
other forms of dismissal.  
As a result there is an “implicit agreement” between the employer and the employee. The employer 
makes use of the unfair dismissal figure (in Spanish, despido improcedente), paying to the worker the 
highest severance. On the other hand, the employee agrees on signing the unfair dismissal because 
he/she has no incentives to sue the employer as, this way, the maximum severance pay is achieved. 
Therefore, the employer avoids a long and complex layoff process.    
This distortion in the layoff system also resulted in dismissals due to objective causes representing a 
small percentage of the total, even in times of economic crisis, when it would be justified to use this 
form of laying off staff (Malo, 2005; García Martínez and Malo, 2007).  
The 2010 labour reform introduced a new version of the economic reason for dismissal, trying to 
impose a severance for terminating a contract for economic reasons as the new system norm and 
thus correcting the mentioned distortion (García-Serrano et al., 2010). The goal was to deploy the 
new definition of economic cause to effectively lay off staff easily in the case of financial difficulties. 
The reform implemented in 2012 followed the same direction, again redefining the causes for 
economic layoffs and eliminating the “express layoff”. 
In the years studied, dismissals due to Law 45/2002 constituted over three quarters of the total, 
slightly increasing their share up to 2007 and decreasing from then onwards, especially in 2011, when 
they amounted to 70.6% of the total. This change was accompanied by a strong increase in dismissals 
due to economic reasons.  
Regarding assistance claims, the main entrance reason is the exhaustion of the contributive benefit, 
followed by an insufficient contribution period to access the benefit. 
                                                     
 
13 Toharia and Malo (2009) point out that “the reform of 2002 increased the number of layoffs, rising from 
4% of open-ended wage workers in 2000 to 5.5% in all years between 2002 and 2007, with a further increase 
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Table 2. New inflows to unemployment insurance 
 Total Dismissal Suspended work and partial 
unemployment 
End of trial End of 
contract 
Other 
reasons 
2001 1.091.110 265.760 16.462 9.346 791.412 8.130 
2002 2.228.343 354.215 79.864 31.190 1.621.504 141.570 
2003 1.291.581 372.772 16.835 13.782 880.008 8.184 
2004 1.337.370 397.856 11.546 15.322 904.830 7.816 
2005 1.365.145 419.148 15.367 17.111 905.717 7.802 
2006 1.431.499 449.838 8.244 20.087 944.537 8.793 
2007 1.561.767 497.116 16.259 25.767 1.013.043 9.582 
2008 2.236.753 770.225 40.405 35.839 1.379.358 10.926 
2009 2.557.901 922.615 379.062 28.012 1.213.536 14.676 
2010 1.935.370 739.599 180.409 19.787 980.607 14.968 
2011 1.916.929 729.090 169.345 16.895 982.735 18.864 
2012 2.092.795 760.064 306.358 17.264 985.531 23.578 
2013 1.845.197 671.175 278.471 19.227 846.762 29.562 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
Table 3. New inflows to unemployment assistance 
 Total Workers who have not met the minimum 
contribution period to gain access to the 
unemployment insurance 
> 55 Exhaustion of 
unemployment 
insurance 
PRODI Other 
reasons 
2007 410.297 134.418 53.168 149.865  - 72.846 
2008 572.975 191.137 64.687 233.304  - 83.847 
2009 1.252.935 256.076 98.190 548.961 244.913 104.795 
2010 1.634.331 285.351 116.454 558.873 545.365 128.288 
2011 1.116.900 329.500 124.230 448.908 75.579 138.683 
2012 1.072.086 315.383 119.538 487.887 290 148.988 
2013 996.699 294.388 63.233 477.957 134 160.987 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
The effects of the SUB on exits from unemployment have been broadly analysed, with the common 
result that they are a disincentive for job seeking. These conclusions are confirmed by various studies 
by Arranz and García Serrano (2013, 2014a). These authors show the existing relationship among the 
SUB, the common use of temporary contracts, and rehiring at the same company. They estimate the 
reemployment rate to be 36% for individuals who do not receive benefits and 29% for those who do 
receive them. Thus, in many cases, layoffs or contract terminations are followed by a period of 
receiving benefits and then a return to work at the same company.  
When the analysis adopts a temporal perspective by studying the entry to and exit from 
unemployment of the same individual, the usual negative effect of the benefits on the duration of 
unemployment is reduced in the medium term. The explanation is a high rotation in the labour 
market, which causes quick returns to employment but also rapid returns to unemployment, in many 
cases without the necessary contribution period to access longer benefits. That is, the benefits slow 
the process of labour insertion but also favour retaining employment for a longer period of time.  
Empirical evidence by Alba et al. (2012) conclude the existence of implicit agreements between 
workers and firms as UI beneficiaries tend to return to the same firm when the benefit is almost 
exhausting and they do not observe the same result for UA beneficiaries. The authors suggest that 
the duration of unemployment benefits affects firms’ behaviour in terms of hiring the same worker. 
So unemployment insurance subsidises layoffs when the employer hires the same worker. 
The high rotation in the labour market should be understood in the context of a high temporary rate 
and segmentation. The primary segment has permanent contracts with high seniority so their 
probability of unemployment is really low. On the other side, those workers with fixed-term contracts 
usually have many unemployment periods. In this sense, SUB acts as a subsidy to temporary contracts 
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vs. permanent contracts14. We can observe the intensive use of the SUB through data in Table 4 
where the inflows into unemployment insurance and assistance are differentiated by new inflows or 
renewals15. In 2009, renewals of UI represent more than 60% of total inflows.     
Arranz and García-Serrano (2014b) analyse the use of the SUB by industry. They find that sectors 
such as construction, hospitality, financial services and business services are subsidized through SUB. 
Even though the contributions these sectors pay are the same than those paid by other sectors, their 
workers use unemployment insurance in a much higher proportion.  
Table 4. Inflows into SUB: new inflows and renewals 
 Unemployment insurance Unemployment assistance 
 new inflows renewals new inflows renewals 
2001 1.091.110 828.342 380.352 456.298 
2002 1.237.311 991.032 385.085 462.722 
2003 1.291.581 995.196 382.761 444.956 
2004 1.337.370 1.070.576 382.024 482.792 
2005 1.365.145 1.121.257 374.381 489.267 
2006 1.431.499 1.156.221 379.816 501.623 
2007 1.561.767 1.424.983 410.297 494.663 
2008 2.236.753 1.974.754 572.975 609.211 
2009 2.557.901 4.204.009 1.252.935 1.042.829 
2010 1.935.370 4.646.012 1.634.331 1.946.827 
2011 1.916.929 3.998.207 1.116.900 1.911.894 
2012 2.092.795 5.136.694 1.072.086 1.816.659 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
3.2.2 Exit flow analysis of benefits 
The following tables show the distribution of exits from unemployment insurance (Table 5), 
assistance (Table 6), or RAI (Table 7) as a function of the cause of the exit. As can be expected, a 
change has occurred beginning in 2009, with increased exits due to benefit exhaustion and a decrease 
of exits due to labour insertion. The latter increased by over twenty percentage points from 2008 to 
2009, while exits due to labour placements decreased. Although they are a small fraction of the total, 
cautionary and sanction exits have also increased. However, the definition of “precautionary removal 
and sanctions” is not clear.  
The change in the percentage distribution of exits from the subsidy can be seen in 2010, one year 
later than the benefits, as a consequence of entry into the subsidy programme once the benefits are 
exhausted. Finally, the percentage distribution of exits from the RAI is more stable, with the rate of 
exit due to placement at approximately 20%.  
                                                     
 
14 Although temporary contracts have a higher unemployment contribution, the difference is only 1.25 
points. The general contribution rate for unemployment is 7.05% of the contribution base (the employer 
pays 5.5% and the worker 1.55%). In the case of fixed-term contracts, it increases to 8.3% (the employer 
pays 6.7% and the worker 1.6%). 
15 The unemployment insurance or assistance can be renewed if workers found a new job, they did not 
exhausted the benefits and the duration of the new job is no longer enough to qualify for a new benefit. 
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Table 5. Outflows from unemployment benefits. Unemployment insurance 
 Total Exhaustion of 
benefits 
Placement Emigration Retirement 
and disability 
Precautionary 
removal and sanction 
Other 
reasons 
2001 1.863.084 564.886 1.081.980 2.927 13.533 56.930 142.828 
2002 2.164.639 632.512 1.284.967 3.575 15.890 63.809 163.886 
2003 2.270.998 661.708 1.337.471 3.719 17.530 65.986 184.584 
2004 2.432.189 678.304 1.464.533 3.836 18.249 71.034 196.233 
2005 2.505.310 680.395 1.529.572 3.788 20.115 67.282 204.158 
2006 2.683.722 673.978 1.677.950 4.455 19.794 77.535 230.010 
2007 3.004.581 867.859 1.940.417 10.850 21.936 111.940 51.579 
2008 3.708.960 1.114.979 2.348.303 11.158 24.901 134.076 75.543 
2009 6.892.873 3.617.788 2.984.077 24.418 28.908 135.275 102.407 
2010 6.997.430 3.805.436 2.908.061 33.503 1.500 110.006 138.924 
2011 6.105.002 3.137.122 2.706.782 41.979 32.017 113.284 73.818 
2012 7.446.480 4.333.604 2.797.242 62.346 35.856 127.912 89.520 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
Table 6. Outflows from unemployment benefits. Unemployment assistance 
 Total Exhaustion of 
benefits 
Placement Emigration Retirement 
and disability 
Precautionary removal 
and sanction 
Other 
reasons 
2001 880.757 378.089 321.553 2.776 6.309 42.118 129.912 
2002 876.141 374.166 319.147 2.538 9.806 40.298 130.186 
2003 843.165 338.915 302.988 1.504 19.658 37.486 142.614 
2004 883.341 326.515 321.986 1.421 19.504 37.252 176.663 
2005 877.387 321.905 314.021 1.394 20.786 32.813 186.468 
2006 897.368 303.153 322.141 1.352 21.246 36.052 213.424 
2007 834.274 183.159 383.097 2.161 29.897 48.538 187.422 
2008 922.260 234.735 432.046 2.263 31.189 58.195 163.832 
2009 1.543.066 358.402 779.148 7.046 36.221 94.116 268.133 
2010 3.083.332 960.198 1.458.639 17.598 1.950 186.313 458.634 
2011 2.769.786 896.903 1.280.599 21.388 44.458 164.789 361.649 
2012 2.513.141 706.439 1.202.028 27.847 50.056 146.319 380.452 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
Table 7. Outflows from unemployment benefits. Renta Activa de Inserción 
 Total Exhaustion 
of benefits 
Placement Emigration Retirement 
and disability 
Precautionary 
removal and 
sanction 
Other 
reasons 
2001 13.976 10.487 2.127 3 123 582 654 
2002 67.319 52.822 8.425 26 524 2.651 2.871 
2003 35.365 25.079 5.435 64 153 1.584 3.050 
2004 50.318 31.563 10.604 40 273 2.983 4.855 
2005 70.915 44.559 9.571 32 491 3.550 12.712 
2006 87.610 59.655 2.920 52 453 3.938 20.592 
2007 98.422 60.661 24.233 143 599 6.430 6.356 
2008 102.232 66.571 21.358 149 941 6.813 6.400 
2009 123.931 81.813 24.686 383 1.732 7.663 7.654 
2010 168.634 111.885 33.378 859 350 8.892 13.270 
2011 251.154 158.458 57.345 2.203 2.545 16.538 14.065 
2012 331.914 211.020 76.374 3.652 2.836 21.326 16.706 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
3.2.3 Coverage rate 
The coverage rate is calculated as the total number of beneficiaries who receive unemployment 
benefits over registered jobseekers. The unemployed without prior work experience are eliminated 
from the reference population, as they have no rights to benefits due to not having paid prior 
contributions.  
This indicator achieved its maximum in 2010, starting a falling trend placing it at 62.3% in 2013. The 
reason is the increase in the long-term unemployed (in 2010, the length of job seeking at the PES 
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exceeded two years in 16% of the registered unemployed, with the same number rising to 25.5% in 
2013). As we have seen, the maximum length of the unemployment insurance is 24 months, and the 
access criteria for the assistance or the RAI are more restrictive.  
Figure 1. Benefit coverage of unemployment benefits* 
 
* Total number of beneficiaries who receive unemployment benefits over registered jobseekers who have prior work experience (including 
the beneficiaries of the potential agrarian workers subsidy). 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. MEYSS. 
The information on the SUB coverage can be complemented by the data from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the unemployment data registered in the 
PES and the LFS are different. The former is a registry, while the latter is obtained through a survey, 
which leads to differences. However, we should also consider that there are unemployed individuals 
who do not use the PES as a method of job seeking (and therefore do not register), and some people 
registered in the public employment offices do not fit the LFS unemployment criteria because in the 
survey they do not indicate any active form of job seeking.   
In Table 8, we compare the two data sources. The numbers corresponding to the beneficiaries of 
unemployment benefits are similar to the estimates by the LFS, especially from 2011 onward. In 
contrast, the number of unemployed that are registered shows significant differences from the LFS 
data, especially if we factor in the number of people who state that they are registered with a public 
employment office. Regarding the final comparison, the number of people stating before the LFS 
that they are registered with the PES is greater than the registered unemployment. In this context, we 
have to consider that the number of jobseekers (“registered unemployment”, in Spanish, paro 
registrado) is the result of subtracting individuals who have limited availability for a specific profession 
or seek better employment than they currently have from the total number of PES registrations (in 
Spanish, demandantes de empleo). When comparing the number of individuals registered with the PES 
with the number registered with the LFS, the final difference is somewhat smaller.  
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Table 8. Unemployed workers and jobseekers. Unemployment beneficiaries   
 LFS data  PES data 
 Employed  Unemployed  Inactive  Registered 
and 
receiving 
benefits  
Registered 
and not 
receiving 
benefits 
Total 
registered 
jobseekers 
Individuals 
registered in 
PES* 
Registered 
jobseekers 
Benefit 
beneficiaries 
2006 18.529.098 1.629.333 8.357.991 1.122.144 2.485.402 3.607.546 2.995.448 2.039.004 1.330.432 
2007 19.171.773 1.644.047 8.320.094 1.120.636 2.225.338 3.345.974 3.018.073 2.039.004 1.421.480 
2008 18.854.902 2.357.617 8.137.264 1.429.830 2.415.160 3.844.990 3.587.968 2.539.941 1.814.632 
2009 17.230.834 3.845.758 8.064.619 2.376.324 3.091.274 5.467.598 4.983.119 3.644.041 2.681.223 
2010 16.837.835 4.280.082 7.921.827 2.738.447 3.311.109 6.049.556 5.499.846 4.060.756 3.042.734 
2011 16.516.518 4.588.649 7.791.262 2.634.953 3.725.883 6.360.836 5.745.293 4.257.160 2.845.652 
2012 15.593.685 5.308.064 7.643.108 2.881.979 4.230.875 7.112.854 6.283.596 4.720.404 2.942.061 
2013 15.057.236 5.499.823 7.554.103 2.835.147 4.473.936 7.309.083 6.347.812 4.845.302 2.865.153 
* Including individuals who have limited availability for a specific profession or seek better employment than they currently have. 
Source: LFS (Spanish Statistical Institute) and MEYSS.  
In Table 9, we show the distribution of the LFS unemployed according to their PES situation. Not 
all of them use it as a way of searching for a job, although this proportion has increased from a 
minimum of 70.8% in 2007 to 86.7% in 2013.   
Table 9. Unemployed workers (LFS) according to their PES situation 
 
 
Unemployed  
Registered and 
receiving 
benefits 
Registered 
and not 
receiving 
benefits 
Total 
registered 
jobseekers 
Not 
registered 
in PES 
Registered 
jobseekers / total 
unemployment 
2006 1.629.333 437.348 719.978 1.157.326 472.007 71,0% 
2007 1.644.047 465.276 699.322 1.164.598 479.449 70,8% 
2008 2.357.617 766.372 979.077 1.745.449 612.168 74,0% 
2009 3.845.758 1.586.761 1.553.325 3.140.086 705.672 81,7% 
2010 4.280.082 1.896.588 1.718.533 3.615.121 664.961 84,5% 
2011 4.588.649 1.849.578 2.073.450 3.923.028 665.621 85,5% 
2012 5.308.064 2.099.505 2.493.859 4.593.364 714.700 86,5% 
2013 5.499.823 2.068.348 2.702.189 4.770.537 729.286 86,7% 
Source: LFS (Spanish Statistical Institute).  
Likewise, not all unemployed registered with PES are unemployed according to the LFS definition. 
While this difference has decreased significantly, many still have employment. We must consider that 
although they are excluded from the calculations of registered unemployment, persons with a job can 
register with the PES as a way of searching for a better job. However, the inactive population is much 
more relevant. In 2006-2007, it was over 40%, a percentage that had fallen considerably from the 
start of the economic crisis and achieved a level of approximately a quarter of all registered 
unemployed workers in 2013.  
We also must take into account that this distribution is different by age groups. For registered 
jobseekers over 55, the proportion of inactive population is almost 50%. In this group we have several 
characteristics that lead to reduce the active job search. Firstly, the majority of them have a low level 
of education; secondly, employers prefer young workers to old workers. These two aspects imply a 
low probability of finding a new job. Thirdly, the majority of them are entitled to unemployment 
assistance. Summing up, we can conclude that many workers over 55 who lost their job consider their 
labour trajectory finished, given their low probability of returning to employment and the availability 
of a permanent subsidy. In this case, the unemployment assistance is more related to a social benefit 
than an unemployment benefit.  
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Table 10. Registered jobseekers according to their LFS situation (%)  
 All jobseekers Jobseekers aged 55-64 
  Employed Unemployed Inactive Employed Unemployed Inactive 
2006 22.5 34.4 43.1 10.6 21.8 67.6 
2007 19.3 37.2 43.5 7.7 25.0 67.3 
2008 15.0 48.3 36.7 6.0 30.0 64.0 
2009 11.2 60.8 27.9 5.7 41.0 53.3 
2010 10.5 63.4 26.1 4.9 44.8 50.3 
2011 10.4 65.4 24.2 4.7 47.4 47.8 
2012 9.5 68.6 21.9 3.9 51.0 45.2 
2013 9.4 69.4 21.3 3.7 53.0 43.3 
Source: LFS (Spanish Statistical Institute).  
 
3.3 Other social assistance programmes  
The final social assistance programme to be mentioned is the system of Renta Mínima de Inserción (RMI, 
in English minimum insertion wages). This programme is aimed at people between 25 and 64 years of 
age, in a situation of extreme poverty and with problems of labour and/or social insertion16.  
The programme is managed by the autonomous communities, which in turn means that there can be 
differences in requirements, access, support amounts, or activation commitment criteria17. This 
measure also includes activation components and the obligation to participate in active employment 
measures, mainly job orientation schemes. Nevertheless, we must consider that the characteristics of 
the beneficiaries, who, in many cases, live in conditions of social exclusion, require social inclusion 
activities before or during labour integration activities. 
 
 
4 The role by Public Employment Service 
One of the primary functions of the autonomous public employment system (PES) is the registration 
of job seekers. Registration in an employment office is mandatory for individuals requesting 
unemployment benefits. To the extent to which this requires an active commitment by the benefits 
recipient, registration is a necessary requirement; however, registration does not guarantee that 
payments will be received. Jobseekers must comply with the “commitment to activity”, i.e., active job 
seeking.  
The decentralisation of active labour policies has not caused any drawbacks in the coordination of 
the registration or receipt of benefits. As we mentioned previously, jobseekers go to the same 
employment office to manage their registration and to collect their unemployment benefit. Therefore 
the process has not affected them, and, generally, they are not aware of the redistribution of 
responsibilities between administrations.  
                                                     
 
16 In Arriba (2009) and Rodríguez Cabrero (2009), a review is conducted of the existing minimum wages 
in the ACs.  
17More information is available on the existing programmes in: 
https://www.msssi.gob.es/ssi/familiasInfancia/inclusionSocial/serviciosSociales/RentasMinimas/Docs/Inf
ormeRMI2012.pdf 
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Although the intermediation activity is decentralised, the unemployed need to be guaranteed the 
possibility of moving to other locations and accessing PES vacancies in other communities and 
employment offices. For this reason, a significant functional coordination is important to prevent 
regional borders from hampering benefits. A key element in achieving this has been the 
modernisation of the PES. For example, many employment offices have undertaken an important 
effort to use the Internet to manage job vacancies and some autonomous PES have opened new 
employment offices as part of their plans for the modernization of the PES18.  
Great care is necessary to ensure that decentralisation does not become an obstacle to the integration 
of a single labour market. A single market will prevent the PES from only working within each 
autonomous community. Information from the autonomous Public Employment Services is one of 
the primary data sources of labour market studies, as the information contains local, provincial, 
autonomic and national data. 
4.1 Jobseeker contacts with the provincial and national employment services 
administration 
In order to have access to PES services jobseekers must be registered in public employment offices. 
At registration, regional PES staff will interview jobseekers to determine their labour status, their 
needs and career aspirations. The registered data are personal and contact details, level of education 
and qualifications, languages, professional experience, and positions requested. After the interview, 
PES counsellors can recommend training courses, professional orientation actions or self-
employment support. Registration can be done on-line by filling in an application form with the same 
information above mentioned. This information will also be accessible for SEPE. 
Inscription in PES implies several obligations: the renewal on the appropriate dates (every 3 months), 
attend to the employment office if required, inform about changes in personal and professional 
information, and inform about the results of job interviews if PES is involve in the process.  
If jobseekers are entitled to unemployment benefits, they can apply for them in the SEPE after 
registration. Since passive and active policies are located at the same employment office, jobseekers 
can register and apply for the unemployment benefits at the same time. 
Jobseekers visit employment offices mainly in a voluntary way if they need to find out information 
about vacancies (not only the ones registered in PES but others announced on newspapers or on-
line) or to participate in active programmes (this information is also on-line). However, it is 
compulsory to visit PES if they are requested to participate in active measures or if they are selected 
for a job interview (PREPARA or RAI beneficiaries). 
The offer of on-line services is extensive and has been promoted as a way to improve the access of 
jobseekers to information. At the same time, PES staff can concentrate on services that require 
personal attention to users (mainly PREPARA or RAI services). 
SEPE public statistics do not contain information about jobseekers’ participation on active 
programmes. However, this data and some regional PES information are registered on public reports.  
 
                                                     
 
18 Suárez et al. (2012, 2014) provide a detailed description of the Spanish employment offices to show that 
some of the catchment areas are overly congested and are characterized by huge clusters of unemployed 
people and extremely low accessibility clusters. 
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4.2 Vacancies registry in the PES 
The 1994 PES reform eliminated employers’ obligations to file requests with the employment offices 
to determine how many workers are necessary for particular jobs. Currently, to receive incentives for 
hiring workers, firms must register vacancies with the regional PES. This practice is considered to be 
a “nominative” offer rather than a real intermediation activity conducted by the employment offices.  
Placement statistics offer complete information because they rely on data from contract files. These 
statistics provide information on whether job vacancies were filled, and for offers (vacancies) that 
were registered with Public Employment Services, the statistics indicate whether a vacancy was filled 
by a job seeker.  
Currently, the Job seekers, positions and placements statistics (in Spanish, Estadística de demandantes de empleo, 
puestos de trabajo y colocaciones) allow us to distinguish among placements of active claims with prior job 
offers (in Spanish, colocaciones de demandas activas con oferta previa) and placements of active claims without 
prior job offers. 
The concepts of “with prior job offer” and “without prior job offer” are related to the job offer file. 
However, the concept of “job offers” should be defined first. “Prior job offers” are jobs that are 
offered by employers (vacancies) and registered with the PES so that the PES can ensure that those 
positions are filled by the best possible registered workers. Therefore, “job offers” are vacancies that 
are offered through PES services, and these jobs allow the PES to increase their market share. 
Specifically, as companies increase their trust in the PES and “job offers” are increasingly provided 
to the PES, the PES has more options to fill vacancies and can more easily find adequate positions 
for job seekers. 
In terms of placements, placements of active job seekers with prior job offers are job placements that are the 
result of a prior job offer that was registered with the PES. On the contrary, placements of registered job 
seekers without prior offers are placements of job seekers when no offer was registered with the PES. 
Because companies are obligated to register contracts with Public Employment Services, the 
placements file can also include “without prior offer” situations, which includes placements in which 
the PES was directly and indirectly involved.  
In Figure 2, we distinguish between the total number of placements in the Spanish labour market, i.e, 
the total number of new contracts signed19; the new contracts signed by jobseekers in PES and, the 
placements signed by jobseekers filling a vacancy registered in PES.  
                                                     
 
19 This number is a good example of the high rotation in the Spanish labour market: in 2013, 9.2% of the 
signed contracts were fixed-term. Of these temporary contracts, 25.2% lasted less than 8 days, 5.4% 
between 8 and 15 days and 10% between 16 days and one month.   
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Figure 2. PES placements and registration of new contracts 
 
Source: Estadística de demandantes de empleo, puestos de trabajo y colocaciones. SEPE. 
The vacancies that are managed by the PES are a small part of all vacancies. Companies seldom rely 
on the PES, as they typically use other channels to select their staff (i.e., self-nominations, print ads, 
head hunters and contacts). In 2013, approximately 403 thousand job offers were managed through 
the PES, whereas the total number of placements reached 15 million. These numbers demonstrate 
the limited trust companies have in the PES as a vacancy manager.  
The analysis of how offers are managed is necessary to understand why the PES has a stronger 
presence in certain areas and not in others. This analysis can also be an important incentive for 
employment offices to reflect on the type of offers that are registered with them, which may help 
them to ensure that they are in accordance with the characteristics of the registered job seekers.  
Jobs that are offered through the PES typically involve low-skill work. Approximately 50% of the 
registered jobs are for labourers and skilled workers in the primary sector. In many cases, these jobs 
are related to public administration.  
There is no detailed information available on the placements that result from intermediation activities 
by the PES. Taking into account the limitations of the data, it is possible to estimate the market share 
or “penetration rate” of PES. This indicator is the ratio of placed job seekers in PES covering 
vacancies intermediated through PES over the total of vacancies covered by registered job seekers 
(i.e. placements of active claims with prior job offers over placements of active claims). According to 
this definition, the participation of PES in intermediation activities is low, amounting to 
approximately 6.4% for the 2007-2013 period (Suárez and Mayor, 2012). Nevertheless, the results are 
probably overestimated because we cannot be sure that placements of job seekers in PES covering 
vacancies registered in PES had an effective and real intermediation of PES. 
The low number of placements in the PES and the weak relationship between companies and the 
PES relate to how intermediation was conducted before the 1994 reform. During this period, the 
selection of candidates for registered vacancies was based on the time of registration with the PES. 
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The highest priorities were the long-term unemployed and recipients of unemployment benefits. 
Consequently, the best candidates were seldom chosen according to the offer’s requirements, and 
unemployed workers who were inappropriate for the offered jobs were often selected; these workers 
often had little motivation to work. These practices led to the loss of trust in the PES as an 
intermediary. Thus, when the obligation to request workers from the PES to fill vacancies was 
terminated, companies stopped using the PES.  
Employers work with the PES when they aim to hire members of groups whose hiring is subsidised. 
In this case, evidence suggests that the PES can act in two ways. On the one hand, PES can simply 
manage the hiring of a person who was previously selected by an entrepreneur; on the other hand, 
they can conduct a real selection of the unemployed worker.   
Regardless of the fact that the process of demand and supply adjustment is not entirely representative, 
the work of the PES goes beyond simple intermediation. For example, the aim of the PES is to offer 
assistance and orientation services for the unemployed as they search for companies. 
 
5 Labour market (training and job creation) programmes 
The latest data made available by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security on public spending 
on active policies corresponds to the year 2011. In order to analyse more recent data, we have to rely 
on the budgets included in annual plans of employment policies (APEM). The chart below shows 
data for both the initial forecast on public expenditure, published in November 2011, and those 
annual plans that were subsequently approved, containing a substantial reduction in the budget. The 
lowest expected level is recorded for 2013, ranking below 4 billion Euros. In the last APEM, 
published in September 2014, public expenditure is expected to increase in 2015, yet it remains at 
much lower levels than those recorded until 2011. 
In figure 4, we have the distribution of expenditure by measures. We can observe than Employment 
incentives is the main policy meaning between 0.2-0.3% of GDP. The share reserved for training has 
increased from 0.15% of GDP in 2004 to 0.2% in 2011. Also expenditure in PES has risen, especially 
in 2009-2010 (probably due to additional counsellors hired in order to assist with the great increase 
in unemployment). Finally, we have to outline the role of start-up incentives. Although this type of 
incentives represents a small proportion of the overall expenditure in ALMP, it has doubled from 
2004 to 2010.   
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Figure 3. Public expenditure in active market policies in Spain (million Euro) 
 
Source: AEL. MEYSS. 
Figure 4. Public expenditure in ALMP in Spain (% GDP) 
 
Source: Public expenditure and participant stocks on LMP. OECD. 
Data from Eurostat include the distribution of ALMP expenditure by type of action, distinguishing 
between national and regional data (Table 11). Regional expenditure is 9% of total, although there 
are differences according the type of intervention. Thus, in the case of direct job creation, a quarter 
of the total expenditure is regional.  
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Table 11. Expenditure in ALMP by type of administration (2011, million Euro) 
 National Regional Total Regional  
(% over total) 
Labour market services 990.9 119.2 1,110.1 10.7 
Training 1,791.4 173.6 1965 8.8 
Job rotation and job sharing 124.6 1.4 126 1.1 
Employment incentives 2,472.5 151.8 2,624.3 5.8 
Supported employment and rehabilitation 821.5 29.6 851.1 3.5 
Direct job creation 478.9 161.9 640.8 25.3 
Star-up incentives 1,066.3 130.1 1,196.4 10.9 
 7,746.1 767.6 8,513.7 9.0 
Source: Labour market policy – Expenditure and participants. Eurostat. 
As we have mentioned before, the ALMPs are within the competence of the autonomous 
communities. The resources for their financing come from the General State Budget provided for in 
the SEPE budget. However, each autonomous community can also dedicate its own resources to 
each measure.  
The ALMP expenditure data are difficult to obtain given the dispersed nature of the information. 
Thus, there are autonomous communities where both the budget for each year and its 
implementation are published, while in other cases, these data cannot be found.  As we have explained 
in the previous section, Eurostat data displays the distribution of ALMP expenditure by type of 
action, distinguishing between national and regional data. Unfortunately, this information is not 
available in any report from the Ministry of Employment and Social Security or the Employment 
Departments of the autonomous communities.   
In 2013, changes have been made both in the lines of action within which employment policies are 
framed and in the criteria of territorial distribution of resources20. The Sectorial Conference on 
Employment and Labour Affairs agreed on a new programming assessment and financing model, 
which is set to define a broad range of indicators for the measurement of goal achievement, and 
financing is conditioned upon the meeting of these goals. 
 
5.1 Training 
The policy regarding professional training in Spain can be characterised by the decentralisation of 
course provision (Mato, 2002). Even before the process of decentralisation of competences in ALMP 
to the autonomous communities, training was provided by the autonomous communities and by the 
National Employment Institute (INEM) accredited collaborating centres. The autonomous 
communities, for their part, conducted (and still conduct) training through training centres linked to 
social stakeholders (unions and employers organisations), municipal councils, foundations, and 
various types of associations.  
Currently, the subsystem of professional formation for employment is regulated by RD 395/2007. 
There are 3 basic types of training: 
                                                     
 
20 Order ESS/2198/2013, dated 21 November 2013, with which subsidies in the labour area financed from 
the General State Budget are distributed territorially for their management by autonomous communities 
with assumed powers. 
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- Demand training: company training and individual training permits. In this case, the companies 
have the initiative to organise training, which is financed through a rebate system on the Social 
Security payments made by workers and companies. 
- Offer training: training promoted by public administration, social stakeholders or social entities, 
and private collaborators, subsidised by the Autonomous PES. These activities include training 
activities for the unemployed, activities with an employment commitment, training plans for 
employed workers, and specific programmes for persons with special training needs or with 
difficulties in integration or qualifications. 
- Traineeship: training activities included in the formation contracts and public programmes of 
occupational training where workers can link training activities with professional experience in 
the workplace. These activities are basically Workshop Schools, craft centres, and employment 
workshops.   
Training mainly designated for employed workers is managed through the Tripartite Foundation for 
Training in Employment (in Spanish, Fundación Tripartita para el Empleo), whose board is constituted 
by the Central State Administration though the SEPE, together with the most representative 
employers organisations and unions.  
Training mainly aimed at unemployed workers is provided by the autonomous communities, whether 
through their own centres or collaborating centres. On an annual basis, a public tender is held to 
finance the Intersectorial and Sectorial training plans and Actions linked to professional certificates. 
The SEPE signs training agreements with beneficiary entities so that their Sectorial and Intersectorial 
plans and Actions associated with professional certificates can be developed. 
The 2012 reform included the gradual implementation of dual professional training, including a set 
of training activities with the aim of awarding professional qualifications, combining processes of 
teaching and learning in the company and the training centre. 
 
Usually, participation in training is voluntary. Although registration with the PES is a requirement, 
this step would not lead to reduced participation in training activities as registration is conducted 
immediately. The voluntary nature of training has an impact on the type of worker receiving the 
training. Despite the low educational level of the majority of the unemployed in Spain, individuals 
participating in training usually have secondary education levels (Cueto and Suárez, 2011). That is, 
the persons with the greatest need for training and retraining participate the least in such training 
schemes.  
 
There is a training evaluation plan that focuses on follow-up, satisfaction and financial indicators. 
However, the effectiveness of labour insertion compared to a control group of individuals with no 
training is not being assessed. When labour insertion is analysed, the assumption is that any placement 
that is achieved after training is due to training. Nevertheless, some placements are unrelated to the 
training. To estimate these effects, experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations are necessary, 
differentiating by types of training programmes. The goal would be to determine the effect of a 
particular programme and to distinguish the most efficient measures of success, including 
determining the characteristics that contribute to insertion (i.e., the length of the courses and the 
content) and the most effective characteristics for target groups. There are few examples of this type 
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of evaluations for particular programmes21, concluding a small positive effect of training in line with 
other European programmes.  
 
5.2 Employment incentives 
The main ALMP in Spain are the employment incentives. The high level of temporality existing in 
our labour market has motivated all labour reforms to try to reduce it, and among other measures, 
bonuses for hiring have been used to promote open-ended contracts.  
Throughout the years, the target groups, the amount of help, and its payment methods have been 
modified (a fixed amount or a reduction in social contributions of the firm to the Social Security). 
Furthermore, we should consider that the autonomous communities have their own support 
programmes, which are added to the existing programmes at the state level (Cueto, 2006).  
The evaluations of the hiring bonuses have shown that this type of programmes have large 
deadweight and displacement effects (Toharia et al., 2008; García Pérez and Rebollo, 2009), as their 
positive effects are clearly limited. That is, the majority of bonus hires would have occurred even if 
the company were not to receive the bonus. This result can be explained, at least in part, because 
existing bonuses involved the majority of the active population, reaching most workers (Cueto, 2006). 
This feature seems to have been fixed in the 2010 to 2013 programmes, concentrating employment 
incentives on those groups which have the most difficult access to employment or stable employment 
(young people with few skills and people over 45 years of age). In fact, the Law 35/2010 included, 
for the first time, the qualification level of young workers as a criterion to receive the bonus. Thus, 
the target group was defined as “the unemployed between 16 and 30 years of age with special 
employability problems: registered with the employment office for at least 12 months of the previous 
18, and those who have not finished mandatory schooling.” 
In February 2014, a programme called “Tarifa plana” (in English Flat rate) was implemented. Its goal 
was to promote open-ended hiring through the reduction of business contributions to the common 
Social Security contingencies applied for 2 years to all contracts signed between 25 February and 31 
December 2014 by any company, if they constituted net employment formation. Thus, the amount 
paid by companies would be 100 Euros per month in the case of a full-time contract and from 75 or 
50 Euros per month for the case of part-time contracts, according to the working day. 
Therefore, the “tarifa plana” is applicable to any worker, regardless of his or her employment history, 
qualifications, or salary. Due to this characteristic, its deadweight or inertia effect is expected to be 
significant. 
 
5.3 Self-employment support programmes 
There are numerous measures that seek to incentivise entry of the unemployed into self-employment. 
Although some of these measures are directed specifically at young people (for example, individuals 
under 30 years of age pay a flat rate of 50 euros in Social Security contributions), the majority of the 
measures are directed at the unemployed population as a whole. 
                                                     
 
21 Some of these evaluations are: Cueto et al. (2010), Cueto and Mato (2009), Mato and Cueto (2008) or 
Ramos et al. (2009).  
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One of the most important programmes is the capitalisation of benefits, or the “single payment” (in 
Spanish, “pago único”), which consists of receiving the present value of the unemployment benefit 
to start a business.  
This programme was started in 1985 and has been maintained with some changes. Again, a lack of 
evaluation is a feature of this employment policy. The data allow us to know how many people have 
chosen this measure, but the rates of business survival and job creation among subsidised companies 
are unknown, and there is no comparison with other businesses that are formed without participation 
in the programme22. 
On the contrary, the programme does not differentiate by groups, and support is the same regardless 
of the characteristics of the recipient (age is occasionally considered) or the type of business that is 
founded. 
Evaluations in other countries demonstrate that the failure rate of new businesses is approximately 
30%. In Spain, data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives reveal similar numbers, and the 
rate has risen since 2008. 
For self-employment to have positive effects in the medium and long term, the selection of 
entrepreneurs with growth potential is essential. The degree of innovation and the entrepreneur’s 
qualifications are key elements in business survival and growth. Additionally, economic support and 
counselling should continue for at least three years, which are the most important years for a 
company’s survival. 
5.4 Assessment and results of the active policies 
As mentioned above, during the year 2013, changes were made to the criteria of territorial distribution 
in subsidies. The Sectorial Conference on Employment and Labour Affairs agreed to a new model 
of assessment and financing under which 40% of funds designated for ALMP in 2013 were assigned 
based on the development of variables, which can be briefly summarised as follows: 
 Changes in the number of jobseekers and total number of PES registrations (in Spanish, 
“paro registrado” and “demandantes de empleo”). 
 Degree of compliance with the Annual Plan of Employment Policies from the previous year:  
 Young people served in each autonomous community and the quality of the service 
provided (length of professional training activities and other actions). 
 Beneficiaries of the PREPARA programme who were assigned an insertion itinerary 
and who had started associated services.  
 People with disabilities served in each autonomous community in comparison with the 
number of people with disabilities. 
 Disciplinary proceedings initiated by the SEPE at the behest of the autonomous 
community regarding the number of unemployment benefits beneficiaries (excluding 
PRODI). 
                                                     
 
22 García-Serrano and Toharia (2008) analysed the self-employment programme in terms of business 
survival and labour trajectory of workers. Although according to their results, two out of every three 
participants in 2003 are still self-employed in 2007, the authors underlined that this analysis has one 
limitation: the lack of control group. In a macro-analysis of the programme, Mayor et al. (2014) suggest 
the possibility of a high dead-weight effect.  
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 Workers capitalising unemployment benefits in a single payment modality. 
 Actions conducted for the promotion of self-employment.  
 Formalised entrepreneur contracts. 
 Templates of people with disabilities from the Sheltered Employment Centres 
 People with disabilities served compared to the number of people with disabilities in 
each autonomous community. 
 Inclusion of certifiable training in training summons. 
 Percentage of training and learning contracts in comparison with the total number of 
contracts. 
We should positively value the inclusion of criteria related to changes in the labour market in each 
autonomous community and the follow up of enacted policies. However, there are missing ALMP 
effectiveness and efficacy indicators with regard to the programme conducted by each autonomous 
community. The number of persons served in each measure compared to the potential number of 
people is an indicator of coverage and follow-up, but this value ignores the results and impact of the 
programmes.  
The 2013 Annual Program of Employment Policy (in Spanish, Programa Annual de Política de Empleo, 
PAPE) does not specifically consider result evaluations. If we focus on this type of assessment, we 
find that there are few such evaluations23.  
The majority of the Autonomous PES conduct action follow-up analysis, publishing indicators 
related to the number of participants in the measures or the rate of labour insertion of the trained 
participants. However, results evaluations with a control group are an exception.  
 
6 Discussion 
The process of decentralising ALMP competence to the autonomous communities took place at 
different times, which implies differentiated experience in management. The experience and the 
knowhow of each autonomous community is diverse, and therefore the implementation of ideas in 
the SNE is becoming a fundamental aspect. Cooperation among various administrations is essential 
to improve performance. The decentralisation of competence does not necessarily lead to 
coordination problems between passive and active policies. A clear regulatory framework is necessary, 
along with established achievable goals. Furthermore, the political will to cooperate is essential. 
Additionally, both organizations, SEPE and regional PES must ensure they have the necessary human 
resources to provide services (especially counselling) to all the jobseekers.  
 
In terms of activation, the only programmes where the activation commitment is effectively verified 
are the PREPARA and RAI. The PREPARA programme has seen a major change in requiring proof 
of an active search before receiving economic support. The weakness of these measures can be found 
in the programmes dedicated to the long-term unemployed, where intervention requires greater 
intensity (longer personalised roadmaps) to achieve the return to professional activities, due to a 
higher loss of human capital and employment search abilities. Accreditation of an active search and 
supervision over the commitment to activation should be extended to all the unemployed, with a 
                                                     
 
23 Ramos et al. (2010) summarize the evaluations of ALMP in Spain in recent years. 
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quicker initial intervention to promote active searching from the moment employment is lost. This 
policy would contribute to a quicker exit from unemployment, reducing long-term unemployment 
and dependence on benefits.  
 
One of the most important challenges faced by the PES is collaborating with companies at the local 
level to attract vacancies to manage. Functions that support companies in the management of their 
vacancies should be distinguished from the placement of groups with poor labour insertion; these 
actions should be linked to other programmes, also in collaboration with companies. In this case, the 
companies would be aware of their role in supporting the placement of certain groups.  
 
Training policy should be focused on two goals: on the one hand, training should provide basic 
qualifications to low-skill workers; on the other hand, the training needs of the sectors with the most 
growth potential should be anticipated. Both the training deficits of the unemployed and the skills 
that are demanded by the labour market should be considered.  
 
The fact that the training initiative primarily focuses on the unemployed leads to an auto-selection of 
participants. Training participants have often completed secondary education and are motivated in 
their job search. Meanwhile, individuals who most need the training are the least likely to participate 
in the programmes. On the contrary, the lack of information on the effects of training and the lack 
of employment perspectives in a crisis can reduce the motivation to participate in training. The PES 
should encourage training among unemployed individuals who have a training gap. The obligation to 
participate has usually negative effects so training should be implemented in the context of a 
personalised roadmap to improve the implication of workers in their way back to work. 
 
A large proportion of the Spanish unemployed population has low qualification levels. Many of these 
individuals have lost construction jobs, so requalification and retraining are key elements to improve 
labour insertion. Participation in training should be likened to following a personalised roadmap; with 
the help of counsellors, the strategy that will most effectively lead to employment should be designed. 
The PES must participate in the selection of training beneficiaries by directing unemployed workers 
toward activities that improve their position on the labour market.  
 
The main ALMP in Spain are the support measures for the hiring of workers. The result assessments 
of this type of programmes find significant deadweight and displacement effects. If support is 
generalised (targeting many groups), these programmes lose all their effectiveness, becoming merely 
a transfer to companies. Hiring support, whether in the form of bonuses or reduction in the amount 
of common Social Security contingencies, should be used for very specific groups of workers, only 
incentivising the employment of groups with difficulties of labour insertion.  
Moreover, criteria adjusting the amount of aid are basically sex and age related, ignoring educational 
level. This variable contributes more significantly to the explanation of labour insertion for the people 
in question and, in fact, individuals with a low level of qualifications have been affected to a greater 
degree by employment destruction.   
 
Currently, follow-up of the conducted measures is being performed, mainly in terms of the number 
of beneficiaries and their profile, but there are few results evaluations. It is necessary for the results 
evaluations to be established from the moment of ALMP design, with experimental or quasi-
experimental designs. Control group assessments that determine the effect and impact of the 
28 
 
programmes in terms of labour insertion in the medium and long term are essential for a more 
efficient design of policies. 
However, external assessments have the advantage of being more objective regarding the strengths 
and weaknesses of the programmes, which can lead to change recommendations focused on 
improving the measures’ efficiency. Furthermore, the results should be made publicly available so 
that the information can reach all stakeholders. This publication would seek to promote the exchange 
of best practices, promoting the programmes with the most positive effects. 
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